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INTRODUCTION 
Today, it is difficult to pinpoint what the “average” American 
family looks like.1 While many children are raised in the typical two-
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2012, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. in Political Science, 
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parent household, others are brought up in single-parent homes and 
have grandparents, siblings, babysitters, and day care workers who play 
a dominant role in caring and providing for them.2 While no legal right 
to visitation existed for third parties3 at common law,4 states began 
passing third party visitation statutes in the 1960s to protect children’s 
relationships with third parties.5 While all of these statutes currently 
allow grandparents to petition the court for visitation with their 
grandchildren,6 some also permit siblings to ask for continued contact 
with their brother(s) and/or sister(s).7 As a result, trial judges are forced 
to decide whether to grant third party petitions for visitation with a child 
over the objection of the child’s legal parents.8 
Many children and adults seeking sibling visitation either are or 
have been in foster care or have a sibling presently in foster care.9 As of 
September 30, 2009, nearly 500,000 children in the United States were 
in the foster care system.10 Alarmingly, sixty-five to eighty-five percent 
of these children had at least one sibling, and roughly thirty percent of 
 
Wake Forest University, cum laude, 2007.  I would like to thank Professor Solangel 
Maldonado for her valuable insight and guidance throughout the writing process and my 
family for their continued love and support. 
1 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000). 
2 Id. at 63-64; SUSAN SCARF MERRELL, THE ACCIDENTAL BOND 12 (1995). 
3 In visitation and child custody disputes, a third party is considered to be any person 
other than a child’s biological or adoptive parents. See Argenio v. Fenton, 703 A.2d 1042, 
1044 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (“Disputes involving custody of a minor child, other than those 
involving a parent against another parent, are considered to be ‘third-party’ disputes.”). 
4 See, e.g., In re Ash, 507 N.W. 2d 400, 402 (Iowa 1993) (“Custodial parents have a 
common law veto power over visitation between the child and all other third parties, except 
the non-custodial parent.”). 
5 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64; Ellen Marrus, Over the Hills and Through the Woods to 
Grandparents’ House We Go: Or Do We, Post-Troxel?, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 751, 772 (2001). 
6 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 74 n.1. 
7 Examples of states permitting siblings to petition the court for visitation include 
Louisiana, New Jersey, and New York. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136 (West 1999) (relatives 
by blood or affinity, former stepparents, or stepgrandparents); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
9:344(C) (West 2000) (grandparents and siblings); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1(a) (West 
2010) (grandparents and siblings); N.Y DOM. REL. LAW § 71 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 
2003) (siblings). 
8 Marrus, supra note 5, at 772. 
9 I thank Professor Solangel Maldonado for this observation. Conversation with 
Solangel Maldonado, Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law (Jan. 10, 2011). 
10 The exact number of children in the foster care system was 423,773. The AFCARS 
Report, U.S. DEP’T OF HEATH AND HUMAN SERV., http://www.acf.hhs.gov/ 
programs/cb/stats_research/ afcars/tar/report17.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2011). 
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those children had four or more siblings.11 Having recognized the 
importance of the sibling relationship,12 New Jersey requires in its Child 
Placement Bill of Rights Act13 that the State make “best efforts” to place 
siblings together when they are removed from their homes.14 However, 
if this is not possible, the State must facilitate regular visitation between 
siblings.15 After adoption, New Jersey’s Grandparent and Sibling 
Visitation Statute affords siblings the opportunity to petition the court 
for continued visitation with their brother(s) and/or sister(s), subject to a 
best interests inquiry.16 
In interpreting third party visitation statutes, courts have taken 
widely different approaches. In Troxel v. Granville, the seminal case 
concerning third party visitation, the Supreme Court analyzed the 
constitutionality of a Washington statute allowing “‘any person’ to 
petition a superior court for visitation rights ‘at any time,’ and 
authoriz[ing] that court to grant such visitation rights whenever 
‘visitation may serve the best interest of the child.’”17 The Court held 
that the statute was unconstitutional because it failed to give any 
“special weight” to the mother’s decision concerning what was in the 
best interests of her daughters.18 After Troxel, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court addressed grandparent visitation under the State’s Grandparent 
and Visitation Statute in Moriarty v. Bradt.19 The Court ultimately 
rejected Troxel’s “special weight” determination and instead adopted an 
avoidance of harm standard, a much higher threshold than that set forth 
by the Supreme Court.20 Several years later, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court extended Moriarty’s avoidance of harm standard to sibling 
petitions in In re D.C., holding that sibling visitation cannot be denied 
under the Grandparent and Sibling Visitation Statute if the child at issue 
 
11 The Sibling Bond: Its Importance in Foster Care and Adoptive Placement, NAT’L 
ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE (Oct. 12, 2010), http://naic.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/f_siblin.cfm. 
12 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-2(a)-(b) (West 2010). 
13 The Child Placement Bill of Rights Act addresses the rights of children removed 
from their homes by the State. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-4 (West 2010). 
14 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-4(d) (West 2010). 
15 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-4(f) (West 2010). 
16 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1(a) (West 2010). 
17 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60. 
18 Id. at 69-70. 
19 Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 88 (2003). 
20 Id. at 115. 
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would be harmed by the court’s refusal to grant such contact.21 
In looking at the approach outlined in Troxel, as compared to 
Moriarty and D.C., serious questions emerge whose answers could pose 
sober realities for New Jersey siblings seeking to maintain contact with 
their brother(s) and/or sister(s) after their adoption by non-relatives. For 
example, Troxel and D.C. set forth two completely different standards 
concerning third party visitation. Troxel does not require evidence that 
the child will suffer harm if contact with the third party is denied.22 
Rather, it merely obligates the court to give special weight or deference 
to the parent’s determination that visitation with the petitioner would 
not be in the child’s best interests.23 However, Moriarty requires 
evidence that the child will be harmed before the court can order contact 
with the petitioner over the objections of the child’s legal parent,24 and 
D.C. applies this avoidance of harm standard to siblings.25 These 
different standards require lawmakers to examine which standard 
furthers the child’s best interests, in light of the differing definitions of 
sibling relationships and the sibling bond. Moreover, under the 
“stringent” avoidance of harm inquiry, many siblings may not have 
sufficient resources to show that a child would suffer harm, even if 
harm to the child would likely occur. 
This Note argues that while the avoidance of harm standard is 
possibly suitable in some third party visitation cases, such as those 
involving a grandparent, it is not appropriate in post-adoption sibling 
visitation cases because of the special bond shared between siblings, the 
critical role that siblings play in a child’s development, and the potential 
chilling effect that this standard could have on sibling visitation. 
Instead, the New Jersey Supreme Court should adopt a presumption that 
denying sibling contact after adoption will cause the child harm. This 
presumption is supported by social science and psychological studies 
and will deter the potential chilling effect of the avoidance of harm 
standard on sibling visitation petitions. 
Part I of this Note discusses how states define sibling relationships 
and what the sibling bond entails. It will show that states often vary in 
how they classify “siblings” and that children’s definitions differ 
 
21 In re D.C., 203 N.J. 545, 573 (2010). 
22 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73. 
23 Id. at 69. 
24 Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 115. 
25 In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 573. 
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markedly from state designations. Furthermore, it will describe the bond 
shared between siblings, one that is emotionally powerful and vitally 
important throughout both childhood and the duration of one’s life.26 
This bond frequently intensifies between siblings who are subject to 
abuse and neglect by their parents because they learn from a young age 
that they must rely upon their brother(s) and/or sister(s) in order to deal 
with their shared problems at home.27 
Part II of this Note examines New Jersey’s Child Placement Bill of 
Rights Act and Grandparent and Sibling Visitation Statute. It will also 
analyze the Troxel, Moriarty, and D.C. decisions to illustrate the 
different standards applied by the United States Supreme Court and the 
New Jersey Supreme Court in third party visitation cases. 
Finally, Part III will evaluate the issues raised between the Troxel 
and D.C. inquiries and discuss two specific problems that emerge. First, 
applying the avoidance of harm standard in cases of sibling visitation 
does not give enough deference to the extensive research on the sibling 
bond and largely ignores the fact that the sibling relationship becomes 
more important for children who have been exposed to abuse and 
neglect by their parents.28 Second, the D.C. holding could chill sibling 
petitions for post-adoption visitation. Siblings may feel overwhelmed by 
the “stringent” burden that the avoidance of harm standard imposes and 
choose not to pursue visitation because of the grey area in current legal 
analysis. Because of these problems, the avoidance of harm standard is 
not appropriate for cases involving post-adoption sibling visitation.29 
 
26 Sibling Issues in Foster Care and Adoption, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY (Dec. 
2006), http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/siblingissues/siblingissues.pdf. 
27 NAT’L ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 11. 
28 Mary Anne Herrick & Wendy Piccus, Sibling Connections: The Importance of 
Nurturing Sibling Bonds in the  Foster Care System, 27 CHILD. AND YOUTH SERV. REV. 5, 
available at http://media-server.amazon.com/exec/drm/amzproxy.cgi. 
29 This paper takes no position on whether the avoidance of harm standard is 
appropriate in some sibling visitation cases. Rather, it is concerned only with post-adoption 
sibling visitation because in these cases, the sibling provides the child’s single connection to 
his or her natural family. Additionally, the child needs the sibling more than in cases where 
he or she is still living with the natural family. 
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I. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES ON THE 
SIBLING RELATIONSHIP 
A. What Constitutes a Sibling Relationship? 
Across the country, states vary in how they define sibling 
relationships and in their policies regarding sibling placement and 
visitation.30 Some states provide that children who have a biological 
parent in common constitute siblings, while others maintain that step-
siblings are, in fact, siblings.31 The primary difficulty with current state 
definitions is that they often leave out groups that children identify as 
siblings, such “fictive kin”32 and foster care co-residents.33 Moreover, 
judicial enforcement of state statutes permitting sibling visitation often 
depends on whether the siblings have an established, personal 
relationship before their entrance into state custody.34 In New York, for 
example, courts hold that although the legislature favors the sibling 
relationship once siblings are placed outside the home, the State is not 
required to place siblings together if they have never met and does not 
 
30 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 26. 
31 Arizona law states that “‘sibling’ includes a person who shares a common biological 
parent, stepparent, or adoptive parent.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-543(F) (LexisNexis 2010). 
Likewise, under California law, “‘sibling’ means a child related to another person by blood, 
adoption, or affinity through a common legal or biological parent.” CAL. WELF. & INST. 
CODE § 362.1(3)(c) (West 2010). Furthermore, Iowa law provides that “‘[s]ibling’ means an 
individual who is related to another individual by blood, adoption, or affinity through a 
common legal or biological parent.” IOWA CODE § 232.2(52) (2010). 
32 In child advocacy, the phrase “fictive kin” is used to describe relationships where a 
child has a strong, enduring bond with another child who is not, in fact, their biological 
sibling. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 26. 
33 Children are generally less formal in their distinctions concerning who is or is not 
their brother or sister. Specifically, children who are part of the foster care system often 
develop connections with children who may or may not be their biological siblings. These 
children have been found to view any of the following as their sibling: “full or half-siblings, 
including any children who were relinquished or removed at birth; step-siblings; other close 
relatives or non-relatives living in the same kinship home; foster children in the same 
family; orphanage mates or group-home mates with a close, enduring relationship; and 
children of the partner or former partner of the child’s parent.” CHILD WELFARE INFO. 
GATEWAY, supra note 26; Aron Shlonsky et al., The Other Kin: Setting the Course for 
Research, Policy, and Practice with Siblings in Foster Care, 27 CHILD. AND YOUTH SERV. 
REV. 697, 707, available at www.elsevier.com/locate/childyouth. 
34 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 26. 
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have to facilitate sibling contact.35 Although the New Jersey Legislature 
has not specifically defined a “sibling relationship,” it has set forth 
procedures in its Child Placement Bill of Rights Act and Grandparent 
and Sibling Visitation Statute governing sibling visitation pre- and post-
adoption.36 These provisions will be discussed in-depth later in this 
Note. 
B. The Sibling Bond 
Over the past two decades, the relationship between siblings has 
increasingly become recognized as playing a part in a child’s growth.37 
Until the 1980s, little research existed concerning the bond between 
siblings.38 However, as social scientists began realizing the importance 
of this relationship, research on the impact that sibling relationships 
have on a child’s emotional welfare gained traction.39 Today, researchers 
and courts alike acknowledge the significance of the sibling bond and 
the influence it has on a child’s development.40 
Brothers and sisters share a bond unlike that experienced between 
any other persons.41  Sibling relationships frequently span the course of 
a lifetime,42 and for many individuals, “it is the longest lasting 
relationship [they] have, longer than the parent/child or husband/wife 
relationship.”43 Research shows that children who maintain a positive 
relationship with their sibling(s) possess a higher degree of self-worth, 
are less likely to experience loneliness, and behave better than siblings 
who do not.44 Specifically, recent studies from the United Kingdom 
suggest that both younger and older individuals who grow up with a 
sister are happier and more optimistic than those who do not, 
particularly if they have divorced parents.45 These psychologists contend 
 
35 Shlonsky et al., supra note 33, at 703. 
36 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-4 (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West 2010). 
37 Sonia J. Leathers, Separation from Siblings: Associations with Placement Adaptation 
and Outcomes Among Adolescents in Long-Term Foster Care, 27 CHILD. AND YOUTH SERV. 
REV. 793, 794, available at www.elsevier.com/locate/childyouth. 
38 NAT’L ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 11. 
39 NAT’L ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 11; In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 560. 
40 In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 561. 
41 NAT’L ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 11. 
42 Shlonsky et al., supra note 33, at 698. 
43 NAT’L ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 11. 
44 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 26. 
45 Deborah Tannen, Why Sisterly Chats Make People Happier, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 
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that although sisters tend to discuss more personal topics with one 
another than with their brothers, these sibling communications 
nevertheless strengthen connections with one another.46 
The sibling bond changes and develops over the course of one’s 
life, largely because brothers and sisters are constantly evolving.47 
According to one author, “[o]ur siblings . . . affect us from earliest 
childhood onward in a variety of ways: [w]e share space in the family 
with them, we learn from them and teach them, we divide up parental 
loyalties with them, we envy them, admire them, dominate them, hate 
them, love them.”48 Throughout their early years, a child’s interaction 
with his or her brother(s) and sister(s) sets the groundwork for a large 
percentage of his or her later intimate relationships.49 Siblings comprise 
a child’s initial peer group, and children develop social skills from 
negotiating with their brothers and sisters.50 It is through these 
interactions that they, as children, develop their ability to connect with 
their larger world.51 During adolescence, siblings generally attempt to 
exercise their independence and individuality, which commonly strains 
their once-close ties.52 However, during adulthood, the sibling bond will 
frequently re-develop and grow stronger than ever before.53 The bond 
generally becomes strongest when brothers and sisters reach old age.54 
This is largely because siblings often become each other’s companions 
once again, as they are alone with their parents and spouses having 
already passed away and/or their children having left home to venture 
into adulthood.55 At this point in their journeys, some siblings choose to 
live together for the rest of their lives.56 
Although children who are raised in functional families bond with 
their sibling(s),57 the sibling relationship often takes on more importance 
 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/26/health/26essay.html. 
46 Id. 
47 MERRELL, supra note 2, at 11. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 26. 
51 NAT’L ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 11. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 NAT’L ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 11. 
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for children who have been exposed to abuse and neglect by their 
parents.58 Deprived children learn from a young age that they must rely 
upon their sibling(s) in order to deal with their shared problems at 
home.59 When children are placed in the foster care system, they 
frequently experience significant grief because of the separation from, 
and loss of, continuous contact with their parents.60 Many of these 
children want to maintain contact with their biological parents,61 and 
“the continued presence of siblings may be vital for maintaining a sense 
of safety and emotional continuity in an unknown and potentially 
frightening situation.”62 
However, siblings who are separated from each other during this 
period, or at adoption, are forced to go through the grieving process for 
a second time, which can exacerbate their original feelings of guilt and 
loneliness and be even more devastating.63 In 1999, researchers 
conducted a series of interviews with children entering the foster care 
system; they found that these children frequently experienced feelings 
of worry about their brother(s) and/or sister(s) and narrated their lives 
with detailed accounts of their sibling relationship(s).64 Other studies 
indicate that “many children believe they have lost a part of themselves 
when they are separated from their brothers and sisters, and their grief at 
this loss is aggravated by the worry and guilt they feel when they enter 
care.”65 Furthermore, siblings separated from one another often struggle 
with creating and maintaining a positive self-identity, which causes 
them to feel worthless, unwanted, or unlovable.66 Thus, child advocacy 
scholars contend that maintaining the sibling relationship is extremely 
important for children who are removed from their homes because it 
allows them to preserve a sense of stability in a chaotic set of 
circumstances.67 
The New Jersey Legislature and courts view the sibling bond as 
 
58 Herrick & Piccus, supra note 28, at 3. 
59 Id. 
60 NAT’L ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 11. 
61 Solangel Maldonado, Permanency v. Biology: Making the Case for Post-Adoption 
Contact, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 321, 328 (2008). 
62 Shlonsky et al., supra note 33, at 698. 
63 NAT’L ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 11. 
64 Herrick & Piccus, supra note 28, at 5. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Herrick & Piccus, supra note 28, at 8. 
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unique and important, evidenced by the Legislature’s addition of 
siblings to its Visitation Statute in 1987 and New Jersey courts’ 
decisions on this subject.68 Indeed, New Jersey courts have heeded to the 
case law and scholarly writings valuing the nurturing and sustaining of 
sibling relationships.69 For example, in L. v. G., the Superior Court 
determined that “[a] sibling relationship can be an independent and 
emotionally supportive factor for children in ways quite distinctive from 
other relationships, and there are benefits and experiences that a child 
reaps from a relationship with his or her brother(s) or sister(s) which 
truly cannot be derived from any other.”70 The court further stated that 
“[t]he bonds which develop between brothers and sisters are strong 
ones, and are, in most cases, irreplaceable.”71 Similarly, in D.C., the 
New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the “critical” importance of the 
sibling bond for children who live in “chaotic circumstances.”72 
II. LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW ON THIRD PARTY 
VISITATION STATUTES 
A. New Jersey Legislation 
1. Child Placement Bill of Rights Act 
In New Jersey, the Child Placement Bill of Rights Act governs 
sibling visitation once a child is removed from his or her home.73 Under 
the Act, the Legislature recognized that a child placed outside his or her 
home possesses certain rights that are independent of those maintained 
by the child’s parents or legal guardian and set forth the obligations that 
the applicable department has to the child.74 Specifically, with regard to 
sibling relationships, the Act requires that the applicable department use 
its best efforts “to place the child in the same setting with the child’s 
sibling if the sibling is also being placed outside his home.”75 However, 
 
68 In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 561. 
69 In re Guardianship of A.M.S., 187 N.J. 556, 561 (2006). 
70 203 N.J. Super. 385, 395 (1985). 
71 Id. at 398. 
72 In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 561. 
73 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-4(f) (West 2010). 
74 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-2(a)-(b) (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. §9:6B-3 (West 2010). 
“Applicable department” means the Department of Human Services, the Department of 
Children and Families, the Department of Health and Senior Services, or board of education. 
75 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-4(d) (West 2010). 
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if the siblings cannot be placed together, the department must allow the 
child “to visit with [his] sibling on a regular basis and to otherwise 
maintain contact with [his] sibling” and to provide or arrange 
transportation for this contact to take place.76 
Although New Jersey’s Division of Youth and Family Services 
(“Division”) previously contended that its requirement to facilitate 
sibling contact applies only during the time before parental rights have 
been terminated, the New Jersey Supreme Court interpreted the Act’s 
legislative history to mean that the Legislature did not intend to disrupt 
sibling contact between pre- and post- termination of parental rights and 
that the Division’s obligation to the child continues until the court 
finalizes his or her adoption.77 The court found that under the Act, 
maintaining sibling contact while children are placed outside their 
homes is of extreme importance.78 The Division has a responsibility “to 
nurture sibling bonds . . . whether or not a sibling has initiated the 
process [of seeking access] and whether or not termination has 
occurred.”79 Indeed, the Division recognizes the significance of this 
obligation, believing that “[m]aintaining contact with brothers and 
sisters supports the child’s identity and links him to his past.”80 If the 
Division opposes visitation between the siblings for any reason, it must 
demonstrate that such visitation would be harmful to the child’s health, 
physical welfare, psychological well-being, and safety and would be 
contrary to the child’s individual mental or physical development, as set 
forth in the Act.81 
2. New Jersey Adoption Act 
New Jersey’s Adoption Act applies not only in cases involving 
children voluntarily relinquished at birth, but also in ones where the 
court has terminated a parent’s rights and the child is subsequently 
adopted.82 The Act defines when it will enter a judgment of adoption and 
specifies what rights are conferred upon the adoptive family as a new 
 
76 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-4(f) (West 2010). 
77 In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 562-564. 
78 Id. at 564. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 565. 
81 Id. 
82 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-44 (West 2010). 
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unit.83 Consequently, once a child is adopted, the Child Placement Bill 
of Rights Act no longer applies, and the Grandparent and Sibling 
Visitation Statute governs sibling petitions for visitation.84 
Under the Act, the court must find “that the parent has 
substantially failed to perform the regular and expected parental 
functions of care and support of the child, although able to do so, or 
that . . . [this] inability . . . is unlikely to change in the immediate 
future” in order for it to enter a judgment of adoption.85 Once an 
adoption is finalized, all of the biological parents’ rights and 
responsibilities to the adopted child are terminated, except those 
specified before the entry of judgment has been entered.86 At that time, 
the adopting parent possesses the same relationships, responsibilities, 
and rights as the biological parent previously did.87 It is the policy of 
New Jersey courts to ensure that the new adoptive unit is “given the 
right to grow and develop as an autonomous family.”88 
3. Grandparent and Sibling Visitation Statute 
At common law, third parties were not permitted to petition the 
court for visitation with a child, as visitation was seen exclusively as a 
parental right.89 This conception changed as social scientists put research 
forward that a child’s relationship with his or her grandparents was 
unique and had a significant, emotional influence on the child’s 
development.90 In 1972, New Jersey adopted its first Visitation Statute, 
which allowed grandparents to petition the court for visitation with a 
grandchild.91 Although the original Visitation Statute allowed visitation 
between a child and his or her grandparent(s) only if the child’s parents 
were deceased or divorced,92 the statute was later amended to afford 
standing “to grandparents to seek visitation when ‘either or both of the 
parents of a minor child . . . is or are deceased, or divorced or living 
 
83 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-50 (West 2010). 
84 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1(a) (West 2010). 
85 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-46(a)(1)-(2) (West 2010). 
86 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-50(c)(1) (West 2010). 
87 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-50(b) (West 2010). 
88 In re Adoption of a Child by W.P. and M.P., 163 N.J. 158, 175 (2000). 
89 In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 558. 
90 Id. at 559. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
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separate and apart in different habitats False”93 This limitation was 
eliminated in 1993, thus opening the door for all grandparents to 
petition the court to visit their grandchildren over the parent’s 
opposition.94 
In 1987, the New Jersey Legislature recognized the impact that 
sibling relationships have on a child’s emotional well-being and 
expanded its Visitation Statute to include siblings.95 Under the State’s 
current Grandparent and Sibling Visitation Statute, a sibling of a child 
adopted by non-relatives may petition the court to maintain contact with 
the child.96 The burden is on the sibling requesting visitation to 
demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that allowing contact 
is in the child’s best interest.97 In making its decision whether to permit 
visitation, the court is to consider the following factors: 
(1) The relationship between the child and the applicant; (2) the 
relationship between each of the child’s parents or the person with 
whom the child is residing and the applicant; (3) the time which has 
elapsed since the child last had contact with the applicant; (4) the 
effect that such visitation will have on the relationship between the 
child and the child’s parents or the person with whom the child is 
residing; (5) if the parents are divorced or separated, the time sharing 
arrangement which exists between the parents with regard to the 
child; (6) the good faith of the applicant in filing the application; (7) 
any history of physical, emotional or sexual abuse or neglect by the 
applicant; and (8) any other factor relevant to the best interests of the 
child.98 
If the sibling petitioning the court has previously been the child’s 
full-time caretaker, such history is prima facie evidence that contact 
would be in the child’s best interests.99 Moreover, if a family member 
adopts the child, denial of the sibling’s petition would satisfy the harm 
requirement.100 The New Jersey Supreme Court believes that this 
“statute is important because it reflects a constantly evolving legislative 
response to changing understandings of social conditions and a 
 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 559-560. 
95 In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 561. 
96 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1(a) (West 2010). 
97 In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 573. 
98 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1(b)(1)-(8) (West 2010). 
99 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1(c) (West 2010). 
100 In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 573. 
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recognition that maintaining contacts with third parties, including 
grandparents and siblings, may, in certain circumstances, be necessary 
to the emotional health of children.”101 
B. Federal and New Jersey Case Law 
1. Troxel v. Granville 
New Jersey’s Grandparent and Sibling Visitation Statute is similar 
to that of many states, in that it authorizes courts to order visitation over 
the objections of child’s parents so long as visitation is in the child’s 
best interests.102 However, in 2000, the United States Supreme Court in 
Troxel v. Granville rejected the best interest standard in third party 
visitation disputes.103  There, the Court was asked to determine the 
constitutionality of a Washington statute allowing “‘any person’ to 
petition a superior court for visitation rights ‘at any time,’ and 
authoriz[ing] that court to grant such visitation rights whenever 
‘visitation may serve the best interest of the child.’”104 Brad Troxel and 
Tommie Granville, an unmarried couple, had two daughters together, 
Isabelle and Natalie.105 The couple ended their relationship in 1991, and 
Brad, Isabelle, and Natalie spent their weekend visitation with the 
Troxels.106 In May 1993, Brad committed suicide.107 While Granville 
allowed her daughters to continue visiting with the Troxels after Brad’s 
death, she informed them in October 1993 that she wanted to reduce 
their visitation with Isabelle and Natalie to one short visit each month.108 
Two months later, the Troxels filed an action in a Washington 
Superior Court seeking to obtain visitation rights with their 
granddaughters.109 After hearing from both parties, the trial court found 
that visitation with the Troxels was in the children’s best interest and 
ordered visitation “one weekend per month, one week during the 
summer, and four hours on both of the petitioning grandparents’ 
 
101 Id. at 562. 
102 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West 2010). 
103 Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000). 
104 Id. at 60. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 60-61. 
109 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61. 
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birthdays.”110 Granville appealed, and in the interim, her new husband 
adopted Isabelle and Natalie.111 The Washington Court of Appeals 
reversed the trial court’s visitation order, concluding that third parties 
lacked standing to petition for visitation unless there was a pending 
custody action.112 The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, holding that 
third parties have no right to visitation absent harm to the child and that 
the statute was therefore invalid on its face because it allowed anyone to 
seek visitation without evidence of harm to the child.113 Thus, the 
Washington Supreme Court rejected the best interest of the child 
standard and required third parties seeking visitation with a child to 
show that the child would be harmed if visitation was denied.114 
In a 6-3 decision with six separate opinions,115 the Supreme Court 
affirmed the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court, but on 
different grounds.116 Justice O’Connor, writing for plurality, began by 
noting that “[t]he liberty interest at issue in this case – the interest of 
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children – is perhaps 
the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court,” 
which implicated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.117 The Court then focused on three primary factors in 
holding that the Washington statute was unconstitutional.118 First, the 
Court found that the statute was “breathtakingly broad” because it 
allowed “any person,” not just a grandparent, to request visitation with a 
child “at any time.”119 Second, Granville never denied the Troxels access 
to her daughters; rather, she merely cut down the amount of visitation 
time to one short visit each month.120 Finally, by failing to give 
Granville’s determination of her daughters’ best interest any special 
weight, the trial court violated the traditional presumption that a fit 
 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 61-62. 
112 Id. at 62. 
113 Id. at 62-63. 
114 Id. at 63. 
115 Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn’t Know Best: Quasi-Parents 
and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. REV. 865, 877 (2003). 
116 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63. 
117 Id. at 65. 
118 Maldonado, supra note 115, at 879. 
119 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67. 
120 Id. at 71. 
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parent will take action in his or her child’s best interests.121 According to 
Justice O’Connor, “if a fit parent’s decision of the kind at issue here 
becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some 
special weight to the parent’s own determination.”122 
However, in reaching its decision, the Court did not apply strict 
scrutiny, even though the case involved a fundamental right.123 
Moreover, the Court did not consider whether the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates that all third party visitation 
statutes require evidence of actual or potential harm to the child before 
courts may grant visitation, the principal constitutional question at issue 
in the case.124 Rather, the Court chose to “rest [its] decision on the 
sweeping breadth [of the statute] and the application of that broad, 
unlimited power”125 and declined to define the scope of parents’ 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Right when third party visitation is 
at issue.126 Thus, as the Supreme Court left the case, no evidence of harm 
to the child is required; instead, courts must only ensure that parents’ 
decisions of their child’s best interests are given special weight.127 
Justice Souter and Justice Thomas both entered concurrences to the 
judgment.128 Justice Souter argued that the Court’s decision should be 
affirmed because the Washington Supreme Court correctly invalidated 
the statute based on the broad nature of the statute’s text, not because of 
how it was applied to any particular case.129 Consequently, he believed 
that there was no reason to determine if harm was required or to 
contemplate the scope of parental rights.130 In his concurring opinion, 
Justice Thomas agreed with the plurality in its recognition that parents 
have a fundamental right to make decisions regarding the welfare of 
their children but believed that the Court erred in failing to articulate the 
correct standard of review.131 According to Justice Thomas, this 
 
121 Id. at 69-70. 
122 Id. at 70. 
123 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 69-70. 
128 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75, 80. 
129 Id. at 75 (Souter, J., concurring). 
130 Id. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring). 
131 Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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fundamental parental right should, in fact, be subject to strict scrutiny.132 
Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy dissented from 
the plurality.133 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens rejected a 
requirement that evidence of actual or potential harm to a child must 
first be demonstrated before a court may grant a third party’s visitation 
request, claiming that such a condition is not supported by the Court’s 
prior decisions.134 Instead, Justice Stevens supported a balancing 
approach, in which all of the parties’ interests would be weighed against 
one another in a court’s determination of whether the third party’s 
petition for visitation with the child should be granted.135 Justice Scalia, 
dissenting from the plurality, did not believe that federal judges were in 
the best position to vindicate parental rights.136 Rather, Justice Scalia 
concluded that state legislatures should be the ones charged with the 
task of defending the rights of parents because “[they] have the great 
advantages of doing harm in a more circumscribed area, of being able to 
correct their mistakes in a flash, and of being removable by the 
people.”137 Finally, Justice Kennedy agreed that the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a parent’s right to raise his or her 
child without undue intrusion by the state but argued that the 
Constitution does not prohibit the application of the best interests 
standard to prevent the risk of harm.138 
2. Moriarty v. Bradt 
Although the Supreme Court did not require evidence of harm to a 
child before a court could order visitation with a third party over the 
legal parents’ objections,139 some states require just that.140 New Jersey, 
for example, is one of those states.141 In Moriarty v. Bradt, the New 
 
132 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring). 
133 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80, 91, 93. 
134 Id. at 85-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
135 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
136 Id. at 92-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
137 Id. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
138 Id. at 95, 99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
139 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73. 
140 California, Connecticut, and Kentucky all require evidence of harm to a child before 
the court will go to a best interests analysis. In re Harris, 112 Cal Rptr. 2d 127, 141 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2001); Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431, 447-48 (Conn. 2002); Scott v. Scott, 80 S.W.3d 
447, 451 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002). 
141 Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 115. 
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Jersey Supreme Court examined what standard applies to a 
grandparent’s petition to the court for visitation with a child in light of 
New Jersey’s Grandparent and Sibling Visitation Statute and the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel.142 In 1987, Patrick Moriarty 
(“Moriarty”) and Julia Bradt (“Bradt”) married, and by 1990, the couple 
had two children, Brian and Tara.143 Moriarty and Bradt later separated, 
and in order to secure visitation with Brian and Tara in light of Bradt’s 
drug abuse, Lynn and Patricia Bradt (“the Bradts”), grandparents to the 
children, intervened in the divorce action.144 At a hearing on the Bradts’ 
action, Moriarty was granted custody of Brian and Tara, and the Bradts 
were given visitation with the children every other weekend.145 Once the 
divorce between Moriarty and Bradt was finalized, Moriarty was 
awarded sole custody of Brian and Tara, and Bradt was given 
supervised visitation in the presence of her parents.146 However, in 1994, 
the court granted Bradt unsupervised visitation with her children, and 
the grandparents visited with Brian and Tara during most of their 
daughter’s weekends with them.147 During this time, significant hostility 
developed between Moriarty and the Bradts.148 Bradt passed away in 
November 1999 from a drug overdose,149 and soon after, Moriarty 
sought to cease Brian and Tara’s visitation with their maternal 
grandparents.150 Based on court-ordered diagnostic evaluations on 
Moriarty, the Bradts, and the children, Family Services recommended 
that the Bradts have unsupervised visitation with Brian and Tara.151 This 
was largely because it believed “the grandparents ‘could serve as a 
conduit with the children’s deceased mother and [could] be a positive 
resource for the children in many ways.’”152 
Moriarty filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that in 
light of Troxel, the trial court was compelled to defer to his decision 
 
142 Id. at 88. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 88-89. 
146 Id. at 89. 
147 Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 89. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. at 90. 
150 Id. at 90-91. 
151 Id. at 91-92. 
152 Id. at 91. 
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concerning grandparent visitation.153 Moriarty’s motion was ultimately 
denied by the trial court.154 It instead ordered that the children were to 
have monthly visitation and one extended summer visitation with their 
grandparents.155 The Appellate Division later reversed the trial court’s 
decision, holding that Moriarty’s substantive due process rights were 
violated by the order of grandparent visitation.156 
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the decision of the 
Appellate Division and reinstated the trial court’s order.157 While the 
United States Supreme Court declined in Troxel to designate the 
appropriate level of scrutiny for third party visitation cases, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court held that grandparent petitions for contact under 
the Grandparent and Sibling Visitation Statute are subject to strict 
scrutiny because a fundamental right (e.g., a parent’s right to autonomy 
in raising his or her child(ren)) is at issue.158 Furthermore, the court 
found Troxel’s special weight standard inadequate because “avoiding 
harm to the child is polestar and the constitutional imperative that is 
necessary to overcome the presumption in favor of the parent’s decision 
and to justify intrusion into family life.”159 Under the avoidance of harm 
standard adopted by the court, the State may not infringe on a parent’s 
fundamental right to raise his or child when there is no harm threatening 
the child’s welfare.160 However, when harm is shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence and the presumption favoring a fit 
parent’s decision-making capacity is overcome, the trial court is to 
create a visitation schedule for the grandparents and the child in line 
with the child’s best interests.161 The court determined that Brian and 
Tara would be harmed if visitation with their grandparents were limited 
because the children’s relationship with the Bradts allowed them to 
connect with their deceased mother.162 Therefore, while Troxel declined 
to address whether harm to the child must be shown under the 
 
153 Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 92-93. 
154 Id. at 93. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. at 94. 
157 Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 95, 122. 
158 Id. at 114. 
159 Id. at 113. 
160 Id. at 115. 
161 Id. at 117. 
162 Id. at 119. 
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Constitution for the court to grant third party visitation,163 Moriarty 
adopted the avoidance of harm standard as necessary to protect the right 
to parental autonomy.164 
3. In re D.C. 
Troxel and Moriarty both involved petitions for visitation with a 
grandchild.165 Additionally, in each case, the children at issue were 
living with a natural parent.166 In In re D.C., the New Jersey Supreme 
Court addressed, for the first time, the applicable standards for sibling 
visitation petitions when the sibling is in foster care and after the sibling 
is adopted.167 In 2005, twins Dana and Donna and brother Hugo were 
removed from their mother’s care by the Division.168 The twins were 
placed in a foster home and Hugo was placed in a group home.169 The 
children also had an adult sister, Nellie.170 In early 2006, Nellie 
requested the Department of Social Services (“Department”) in 
Richmond, Virginia, her home location, to evaluate her as a placement 
candidate for her three younger siblings.171 The Department first 
recommended that Hugo be placed in Nellie’s care, and then in August 
2007, suggested that Nellie take the twins as well.172 However, in 
December 2007, the Department withdrew its approval to place Dana 
and Donna with Nellie, referencing Hugo’s declining grades and 
Nellie’s financial difficulties in its reasoning.173 During the same month, 
the court terminated the mother’s parental rights to all three children.174 
Shortly thereafter, the Division informed Nellie that visitation with the 
twins was to be terminated.175 
 
163 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73. 
164 Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 114-15. 
165 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60; Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 90. 
166 In Troxel, the children at issue were living with their natural mother, Tommie 
Granville. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60-61. The children at issue in Moriarty were living with their 
natural father, Patrick Moriarty. Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 89. 
167 In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 550-51. 
168 Id. at 552. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 552-53. 
172 Id. at 553. 
173 In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 553. 
174 Id. at 554. 
175 Id. 
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Nellie filed an action seeking placement of the twins, Dana and 
Donna, in her care, or, alternatively, for visitation.176 The trial judge held 
that the twins’ foster mother was to retain custody but permitted Nellie 
to visit her sisters.177 However, a visitation schedule was not set out by 
the court, and just one month later, the twins’ foster mother refused to 
allow Nellie maintain contact with her sisters.178 Nellie filed a motion to 
enforce the trial judge’s order.179 The court refused to enforce the order 
and concluded that “the best interests of the children ‘trumped’ any 
rights that Nellie had as a sibling . . . [and] she was not in a position to 
re-litigate the plan of the Division, which remained foster home 
adoption.”180 The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the Division 
did not thwart Nellie’s attempts to visit with her sisters, no sibling 
relationship existed between Nellie and her sisters, and the best interests 
of the twins would not be served by continued contact with Nellie.181 On 
appeal, Nellie challenged the material facts regarding the twins’ best 
interests and contended that there was an abuse of discretion by the trial 
judge in her decision not to conduct an evidentiary hearing concerning 
her visitation request.182 
In a unanimous decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
reversed.183 The court first determined that the Child Placement Bill of 
Rights Acts governs sibling visitation once a child is removed from his 
or her home.184 In dissecting the legislative history and specific language 
of the statute, the court concluded that the Act applies to children 
throughout the entire pre-adoption placement frame and that the 
Division has an “affirmative obligation” to facilitate sibling contact 
during this time.185 Here, the court found that the Division failed to 
fulfill its responsibilities to the siblings under the Act because it did 
little to facilitate contact between Dana, Donna, Nellie, and Hugo.186 
 
176 In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 554. 
177 Id. at 555-56. 
178 Id. at 556. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. 
181 Id. 
182 In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 557. 
183 Id. at 577. 
184 Id. at 562. 
185 Id. at 563-64. 
186 Id. at 566. 
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In deciding whether Nellie and Hugo187 have the right to petition 
the court for visitation with their twin sisters after their imminent 
adoption, the court began by observing, as in Moriarty, that while 
adoptive families, like natural families, have a right to family integrity, 
that right is not absolute.188 Under the parens patriae doctrine, the State 
must intercede when “necessary to prevent harm to a child.”189 However, 
the State could not interfere with parents’ (adoptive or biological) 
constitutional right to direct their children’s upbringing simply because 
it would be in the children’s best interests.190 The Court determined that 
[A]pplication of the best interests standard to a third party’s petition 
for visitation is an affront to the family’s right to privacy and 
autonomy and . . . interference with a biological or adoptive family’s 
decision-making can only be justified on the basis of the exercise of 
our parens patriae jurisdiction to avoid harm to the child.191 
Thus, under the avoidance of harm standard (the same standard 
applied in Moriarty in the context of grandparent visitation), a court 
may award a sibling visitation with his or her brother(s) and sister(s) 
only if the sibling establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 
such visitation is necessary to prevent the child from experiencing 
harm.192 The court noted that under this “stringent” standard, siblings 
having no connection to one another or those with a toxic relationship 
would be denied visitation.193 The Court remanded the case for an 
expedited evidentiary hearing so that Nellie could provide evidence, 
subject to the avoidance of harm standard, that Dana and Donna would 
be harmed if denied contact with her and Hugo.194 
III. PROTECTING CHILDREN’S INTEREST: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF HARM STANDARD 
As discussed previously, a sibling may be granted visitation with 
his or her brother(s) and sister(s) adopted by a non-relative under New 
 
187 Hugo is now over the age of eighteen but still lives with Nellie. While he was in a 
group home, Hugo visited regularly with his twin sisters. Id. at 552, 575. 
188 In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 568 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 
(1944)). 
189 Id. at 569 (quoting Fawzy v. Fawzy, 199 N.J. 456, 474-75 (2009)). 
190 Id. at 573. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 575. 
194 In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 574-75 
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Jersey’s avoidance of harm standard only if the sibling establishes, 
through a preponderance of the evidence, that such visitation is essential 
to prevent the child from experiencing harm.195 “The signal value of the 
harm requirement is that it establishes a qualitative legal standard—not 
a procedural or evidentiary barrier—that is distinct from the ‘best 
interests’ test.”196 Accordingly, “a finding that visitation would be in the 
child’s best interests — i.e., that the child would be better off if 
visitation were allowed compared to if visitation were denied — does 
not suffice to justify the interference with the parents’ rights.”197  This 
standard differs drastically from the Supreme Court’s holding in Troxel, 
where the Court determined that it must give deference to the parents’ 
determination of the child’s best interest.198 New Jersey’s heightened 
standard is not appropriate because it fails to give deference to the 
voluminous research on the sibling bond and could have a potential 
chilling effect on post-adoption sibling visitation requests. Instead, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court should adopt a presumption that denying 
sibling visitation after adoption will cause the child harm.  This 
presumption is efficient and supported by social science and 
psychological studies. 
A. D.C. Gives Minimal Deference to Expansive Research on the 
Sibling Bond 
As discussed before, social science and psychological studies on 
the sibling bond find that the relationship between brother(s) and/or 
sister(s) often becomes more important for children whose parents 
abused and/or neglected them.199 For these children, the relationship they 
maintain with their siblings frequently provides them with the comfort 
and stability necessary to deal with their chaotic set of circumstances.200 
However, the application of the avoidance of harm standard to siblings 
 
195 Id. at 573-74. 
196 Brief for Petitioner at 6, Fausey v. Hiller, 549 U.S. 1304 (2006) (No. 06-863). In 
Hiller v. Fausey, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s order of 
visitation between a child and his maternal grandmother, finding that Pennsylvania’s statute 
providing for “partial custody or visitation to grandparents upon the death of their child who 
is also the grandchild’s parent” survived strict scrutiny analysis.  588 Pa. 342, 344 (2006). 
197 Eugene Volokh, Sibling Visitation, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 24, 2010), 
http://volokh.com/2010/09/30/sibling-visitation/. 
198 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69-70. 
199 Herrick & Piccus, supra note 28, at 5. 
200 Id. at 6. 
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in D.C. gives little deference to the importance of this research. Instead, 
the court’s holding provides that “visitation may only be ordered when 
there’s a finding that denying visitation would cause ‘a substantial 
likelihood’ of ‘serious physical or psychological harm’ to the child.”201 
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that much of the research on the 
sibling bond rises to the level of the avoidance of harm standard. For 
example, the importance of the sibling relationship throughout 
childhood and the duration of one’s life, which largely stems from the 
individual’s development and the benefits associated with 
companionship, would likely not be sufficient for a court to grant 
contact between siblings post-adoption under the harm standard because 
no grave physical or psychological harm would necessarily result.202 
Likewise, the fact that the sibling relationship is the longest relationship 
that most have in a lifetime would also probably fail to meet the harm 
requirement.203 Nevertheless, these research findings are extremely 
important to how one evolves over the course of his or her life, and it 
must be realized that “[a]n order of adoption does not erase the 
emotional bonds children may have with their birth family, especially 
when siblings from abusive homes are split apart by the adoption.”204 
Therefore, by adopting a presumption that denying sibling contact after 
adoption will cause the child harm, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
would rightly recognize the significance of this body of research and the 
fact that an entry of adoption does not simply take away the importance 
of the sibling relationship. 
B. D.C. Could Potentially Chill Sibling Petitions for Visitation in 
New Jersey 
The application of the avoidance of harm standard to siblings, as 
set forth in D.C., could also chill sibling petitions for visitation with a 
brother or sister adopted by non-relatives.  First, as discussed 
previously, the burden is on the sibling to demonstrate, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the child at issue would suffer harm 
if visitation it not granted.205 The court itself understands that this 
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standard is “stringent.”206 Under such a strict guideline, some siblings 
may believe that whatever evidence they provide will not come close to 
satisfying a showing that the child would suffer harm and, therefore, 
will be deterred from petitioning the court for visitation. An additional 
concern is that many siblings do not have the necessary resources that 
would allow them to demonstrate that a minor sibling will suffer harm if 
contact is denied, even if the child would, in fact, suffer harm. This lack 
of resources may result in many siblings not even trying to seek 
visitation post-adoption or being able to meet the avoidance of harm 
standard, despite the likely harm present. 
Questions further emerge as to what “harm” the sibling would need 
to show in order for visitation to be granted. For example, the court 
notes that the harm threshold would be satisfied in the case of visitation 
between a sibling who has been adopted by a non-relative and the other 
who has been taken by a grandparent.207 However, siblings who are 
separated at birth and brought up in different households with no 
communication would fail under the harm standard.208 These two 
examples provided by the court are on opposite ends of the spectrum, 
thereby opening up a grey area concerning petitions. Although it would 
be fairly easy to discern the results of the examples provided, individual 
cases do not necessarily fall into these black and white categories. 
Accordingly, siblings may be dissuaded from asking the court for 
visitation because of such uncertainty. 
However, a presumption that denying sibling contact after adoption 
will cause the child harm would assuage these concerns. First, this 
presumption would lessen the burden on petitioning siblings, making it 
easier for them to gather evidence and have their day in court. It would 
recognize that there are, in fact, situations in which harm to a child is 
present but the sibling may not have the necessary resources to rise to 
the strict level of the avoidance of harm standard. Second, grey areas, 
such as the ones described above, would be largely eliminated. 
Although the counter-argument could be made that adopting this 
presumption would open the floodgates to litigation and strain judicial 
resources, public policy would be violated by allowing harm to 
ultimately befall a child simply because a sibling does not have the 
necessary resources to surpass a stringent avoidance of harm inquiry. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Adoption is a formation of the state,209 and consequently, states 
may require certain things of individuals who wish to adopt.210 While 
mandating post-adoption sibling contact would likely be seen as an 
unconstitutional interference on an adoptive parent’s right to bring up 
the child as he or she desired,211 the importance of the sibling 
relationship cannot be denied.212 Therefore, siblings should be permitted 
to petition a court for visitation with a brother or sister who is adopted 
by non-relatives subject to a presumption that disallowing sibling 
contact would harm the child. 
Although critics argue that post-adoption sibling contact 
obligations deter the goal of having “a system that encourages 
prospective adoptive parents to adopt or at least one that does not 
discourage families from adopting because of fear or additional 
obligations,”213 New Jersey’s current avoidance of harm standard for 
sibling visitation, promulgated by the state supreme court in D.C., 
places an unfair burden on a sibling by forcing him or her to establish, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that post-adoption contact is 
necessary to avoid harm to the brother or sister.214 Given the special 
bond shared between siblings and the potential chilling effect this 
stringent standard could have, the Court should instead adopt a 
presumption that denying sibling contact after adoption will cause the 
child harm. Ultimately, in doing so, the Court will not only recognize 
the importance of the prevailing social science and psychological 
research, but will also acknowledge that situations do exist where harm 
to a child is present but the sibling may not have the necessary resources 
to rise to the strict level of the avoidance of harm. 
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